More Things in Heaven and Earth by Smith, Barry
MORE THINGS IN HEAVEN AND EARTH 
Barry SMITH 
SUNY Buffalo 
What follows is an exercise in hunter-gatherer ontology. More 
precisely, the region of space and of spatial objects will be adopted 
as a happy hunting ground for the purposes of Meinongian meta-
physics. Meinong, notoriously, struggled against the prejudice in 
favour of the actual and fought on behalf of the ontological rights 
of incomplete, impossible, and indeterminate objects. A parallel 
struggle, as we shall see, can be waged in the domain of spatial 
objects. Meinong's ideas can in this way be seen to have relevance 
for studies of the philosophical foundations of the theories of 
land-surveying and of international law. 
1. Heaven 
Heaven, for our (initially purely illustrative) purposes, is simply 
empty space; it is the three-dimensional counterpart of the territory 
that is represented by the Bellman's blank Ocean Chart in Lewis 
Carroll's Hunting of the Snark: 
Figure One: Bellman's Blank Ocean Chan 
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Candidate denizens of empty space are the parts of this space. 
These include: three-dimensional spatial volumes, two-dimensional 
surfaces, one-dimensional lines, zero-dimensional points. (We shall 
ignore such further options as would arise in case a temporal 
dimension in the realm of heavenly objects were taken into account, 
or in case heaven were allowed more generally to contain topoids 
of larger numbers of dimensions. We shall ignore also the issue of 
deviant geometries, space-filling curves, Klein-bottle- and Sierpin-
ski-Menger-sponge-shaped regions, and the like. 1) We shall concen-
trate our attentions further on finite portions of space, though we 
acknowledge that, if the empty universe is itself infinite, then infinite 
spatial volumes, too, for example the western hemisphere of the 
universe, would have strong claims to be countenanced as existing 
within it. 
Suppose, now, that empty space as here defined exists. Do all 
abstractly (geometrically) conceivable finite portions of this space 
exist also? Imagine, for example, _that portion of space which 
consists of two disjoint and non-connected spheres. Does this double 
sphere exist in the same sense (have the same ontological rights) as 
its separate spherical parts? Or imagine a perforated spatial region 
that has the form of a sphere of two-unit radius, in the interior of 
which is a one-unit radius spherical hole. Does this perforated 
sphere exist in the same sense as does the corresponding solid sphere 
of two-unit radius? 
Or imagine some single spherical volume of unit radius. Imagine 
further that this spatial volume is topologically closed (or in other 
words: includes as proper part its outer boundary or skin). Does this 
skin itself exist with the same rights as does the closed spherical 
volume with which we began? And what of the corresponding open 
spherical volume (the residue which remains when the skin is 
conceived, abstractly, as having been removed from the sphere as a 
whole)? Does this open sphere exist as an object additional to its 
closed counterpart? And what of the infinitely many partially open 
and partially closed unit spheres, the results of subtracting different 
1. Our aim is to depart not too far from space as given intuitively, while at the 
same time leaving open the possibility of applying a version of these reflections 
to space as described by the mathematician. 
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fragments of this skin from the original spatial volume - all of 
which, we would do well to bear in mind, occupy the very same 
spatial region as does the closed sphere with which we began? 
Consider moreover the fact that, if the unit sphere exists as a closed 
spatial region, then its complement - that object which results when 
we abstractly conceive the sphere in question as having been re-
moved from the universe - is itself open. Do heavenly complements 
exist with the same civil rights as do the objects which they are the 
complements of? 
In heaven, as we see, there are many questions. 
Some, more brutally minded ontologists (the practitioners of 
ontological force majeure ), might want to resolve these questions 
by conceiving heaven set-theoretically, so that the only heavenly 
entities which existed with full civil rights would tum out to be 
extensionless spatial points. In addition to these one would recog-. 
nize, as entities existing in some second sense, all sets of points, all 
sets of sets of points, etc. This set-theoretic account and the system 
of coordinate geometry which goes along with it have familiar 
advantages. But it also brings problems connected not least with the 
failures of the set-theoretical project associated with Cantor's con-
tinuum hypothesis. A further family of problems arises when we 
consider how the set-theoretic treatment of space is to be under-
stood. If, on the one hand, it is conceived as yielding a mere model 
of space, then it leaves open the very ontological questions which 
are here at issue. If, on the other hand, it is treated not as a model 
but as an exercise in serious ontology - if, in other words, it is 
accepted that spatial regions are sets, then it would follow that such 
regions are abstract objects. But how, then, could they be such that 
concrete things are able to occupy them? 
The set-theoretic account dictates finally a controversial meta-
physical thesis to the effect that space is built up out of points. In 
the absence of secure intuitions as to the truth or falsehood of this 
thesis we should surely seek a more neutral theory - such as 
mereology ._..,which is consistent with both the postulate of atomism 
and its negation.2 
2. See Simons 1987. 
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Mereology proceeds as it were from the top down, taking as its 
starting point in our present case extended spatial continua. An 
extreme version of the mereological top-down approach is generated 
by what might be called Aristotelian mereological potentialism, a 
view to. the effect that the part of a whole can never be an actual 
thing if the whole is.3 My arm, as part of me, is real or actual on 
this view, but it is not a real or actual thing; rather, it is merely a 
potential thing: it would become an actual thing only through 
physical separation. Similarly a collective of bodily wholes, say of 
separate coral reefs, would become an actual thing only if the bodies 
in question were fused together to form a unitary object. These 
constituent bodies would then themselves thereby cease to be actual 
things. (My arm as part of me is, we might say, sub-unitary; the 
collection of non-connected coral reefs is super-unitary.) Since 
heaven is, by assumption, everywhere homogeneous, there is on the 
potentialist view only one candidate heavenly object (only one 
place), namely the universe as a whole. Each putative constituent 
place exists only potentially (i.e. it would exist if, counterfactually, 
heaven were reduced in size in corresponding fashion). 
Mereological potentialism thus avoids the embarrassments of an 
over-generous ontology; it recognizes only one (actual) object. It 
appeals to those of our intuitions which suggest that our answers to 
the considered questions can be a matter of convention only, so that 
such questions might surely be ignored for any purposes of an 
ultimate ontological assay. These advantages of the potentialist view 
are spurious, however; for the very questions raised above reappear 
in modified form in the potentialist framework: do all those candi-
date denizens (open and closed regions, solid and perforated re-
gions, and all the possible sums, differences and complements 
thereof) exist potentially in the same sense and in such a way as to 
· enjoy equal ontological rights? In what follows, therefore, we shall 
defend the (Brentanian) doctrine of mereological actualism, a doc-
trine to the effect that parts exist with the same ontological standing 
as do their respective wholes. If you have a single spherical region, 
then you thereby also already have infinitely many pairs of hemi-
spherical regions, infinitely many quadruples of quarter-spherical 
3. On this terminology see Smith 1987. 
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regions, and so on ad indefinitum. 
The doctrine of mereological actualism asserts that the parts of 
things are as actual as the things themselves. With Brentano ( 1981 ), 
we shall extend mereological actualism to boundaries also, both 
external (the outer surface of the closed spherical region as a whole), 
and internal (interior surfaces, interior lines, interior points, and so 
on). We shall however deny the presupposition that is at the heart 
of set theory to the effect that boundaries - for example isolated 
points - can exist independently of the entities of higher dimension 
which they are the boundaries of. Boundaries are actual things, but 
they are dependent entities; they can exist only in tandem with the 
larger things or regions which are their hosts. Already Abelard had 
remarked that 'A line ... is unable to exist apart from some bodily 
subject,' and as Chisholm points out, 'Brentano makes the same 
point with respect to every type of boundary.' (1992/93) In Smith 
(1993) I refer to the principle that boundaries cannot exist except 
in consort with the higher-dimensional entities which they are the 
boundaries of as 'Brentano's thesis'. 
2. Earth 
I have not the foggiest notion as to how to go about answering the 
various questions raised and left open in the foregoing. One thing, 
however, seems clear: the empty space that is described above is 
from the ontological (as from every other) point of view thoroughly 
homogeneous. What holds in one comer of heaven holds identically 
in every other corner, and for this reason also empty space has no 
dynamics and no history. 
Where space is not empty, however, matters are entirely different. 
Here a range of different sorts of spatial objects can be distinguished, 
in addition to that stock of homogeneous spatial objects (the stock 
of places) which exists purely in virtue of the underlying geometry 
of space. Following the terminology advanced in Smith 1994 we 
can distinguish above all between: 
1. Bona fide spatial objects (for example planets, moons, islands, 
lakes) which exist in virtue of intrinsic physical discontinuities 
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in the material constitution of the earth. 
2. Fiat spatial objects (for example states, counties, land-parcels) 
of a sort which reflect no intrinsic physical discontinuities but 
are rather the product of boundaries drawn on the basis of human 
fiat or convention or are otherwise the artefacts of human 
geographical practices. 
Earth, unlike heaven, contains conventional parts. Fiat spatial ob-
jects, in contrast to the purely geometrical denizens of heaven and 
in contrast to the bona fide ('natural') spatial objects here on earth, 
seem to be human creations: they are entities which come to be 
superadded to the world in consequence of human cognitive acts 
and practices. 
The opposition between what is found or discovered and what is 
made or created is of course nothing new in the history of metaphys-
ics. For present purposes we might distinguish, in the range of 
possible ontologies, between: 
Extreme idealism: the doctrine that all objects are created, or in 
other words that all objects exist exclusively as the products or 
figments of human cognition. 
Moderate (or 'creationist' or 'lngardenian'4) realism: the doctrine 
that some objects are created, some discovered. 
Extreme (or 'platonist' or 'Meinongian') realism: the doctrine 
that all objects are discovered, or more particular that all objects 
are found and not made. 
I shall dismiss immediately the extreme idealist alternative (or is 
there really some extreme idealist who believes sincerely that the 
ground on which he stands, or the meteor speeding towards the 
building in which he sits, is a mere product of human cognition?). 
The important debate, I would argue, is that between extreme and 
moderate realism. Consider, in this light, the case of Wyoming 
which, like many political and administrative spatial objects in the 
United States, has a shape roughly as follows: 
4. See Smith 1980. 
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Figure Two: Hyoming 
From the Meinongian, extreme realist perspective, which we might 
also call 'geometrical Platonism' or 'geometrical objectivism', 
Wyoming existed long before man first set foot on the American 
continent, but so also did infinitely many alternative Wyomings 
(Wyoming displaced 1 inch to the east, Wyoming displaced 1 
furlong to the west, Wyoming minus Crook County, and so on). 
Wyoming is thus to be conceived along the lines of the heavenly 
objects discussed above. Wyoming as it is at present (anno 1995) 
geometrically constituted will on this view continue to exist even if 
Wyoming and one or more of its neighbours should agree to some 
exchange of territory (though our present geometrical Wyoming 
would then no longer be called 'Wyoming' and would likely not 
have any name at all). Surprisingly, this Meinongian view can claim 
the advantages of ontological economy - at least for those who have 
already embraced a suitably rich ontology of spatial objects distrib-
uted purely geometrically across the surface of the earth. For it 
conceives political and administrative spatial objects of the sort 
which might otherwise be seen as being created by acts of human 
fiat as mere logical constructions out of geometrical objects, and it 
is exclusively the latter which are granted full ontological rights. 
The Meinongian account can even do justice to changes in geopo-
litical and administrative borders: entities like Bosnia, or Poland, or 
the Netherlands would tum out from this perspective to be entia 
successiva, whose successive real parts are corresponding purely 
geometrical bits of space. (I am here clearly leaving out of account 
issues pertaining to the fact that the earth itself is such as to occupy 
distinct portions of space at different times.) 
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The competing, Ingardenian view, on the other hand, can claim 
the advantages of naturalness. This view asserts that, in the year 
1890, a new spatial object called 'Wyoming' came into being as a 
result of human fiat and that this object has since enjoyed a certain 
history of its own; thus in the intervening period Wyoming might 
have changed its size or shape or location in relation to other spatial 
objects on the surface of the earth. Political and administrative 
entities are comparable in this respect to organisms - they may grow 
and develop, yet in such a way as to preserve their identity. (Unlike 
organisms they may even, as occurred in the case of Poland and 
Austria, enjoy a period of non-existence after which their identity 
is once again recovered: perhaps we might refer in such cases, in 
Meinongian spirit, to the 'implexive existence of the pure spatial 
object'.) Land-parcels, political and administrative entities may also 
fuse and split, in such a way that new entities are produced out of 
parts existing earlier.5 Certainly Wyoming in this historical sense is 
at any given moment coincident with some region of space of the 
purely geometrical sort; but as we shall argue below it is never 
identical with any such region of space. 
3. Performative Maps 
The Ingardenian ontology of historically existing political-adminis-
trative spatial objects is an extension of the theory of multi-dimen-
sional continua elaborated by Brentano in the papers collected 
together as Philosophical Investigations on Space, Time and the 
Continuum (1988). Brentano there sketches a conception of the 
realm of spatial objects as a lasagna-like, many-layered edifice, with 
realms of heterogeneous ('secondary') spatial objects built up on 
the basis of a homogeneous 'primary' spatial continuum on the 
lowest level. But the theory can also be seen as an extension of the 
theory of performatives worked out by Adolf Reinach in his A Priori 
Foundations of the Civil Law in 1913 (a theory subsequently redis-
covered, though with none of Reinach's ontological sophistication, 
5. They are comparable, in this respect to holes and other superficial entities 
of the sort described in Casati and V arzi 1994. 
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by Anglosaxophone speech act theorists in the 1950s). 
We distinguish first of all between two classes of speech acts, 
giving rise to two sorts of products or consequences, which we shall 
call abstract and concrete, respectively. Commandings, thankings, 
forgivings, warnings and threatenings are performative uses of 
language which yield concrete consequences - above all actions, 
attitudes and feelings on the part of real people, entities which are 
fully a part of the real, historical, world of causal change. Promis-
ings, legislatings, contractings, plightings, baptisings, ennoblings 
on the other hand, are performative uses of language which give rise 
to abstract consequences, to entities sui generis which are not (or 
not directly) subject to causal influences. Examples of such abstract 
consequences are: claims, obligations, laws, rights (including prop-
erty-rights), troths, knighthoods, names, etc.6 
Having drawn this distinction in the realm of linguistic acts, we 
can now point to the existence of a parallel distinction in the realm 
of what we might call performative uses of maps. That is, we can 
distinguish between 
1. concrete consequences of uses of maps, for example actions 
(above all actions of way-finding, acts of war, etc.) and feelings 
(of being threatened, overawed, offended, etc.: see Monmoyer 
1991, ch. 7); 
2. abstract consequences of uses of maps, for example the creation 
of state-, county- and property-boundaries, as also of such 
entities as the International Date Line, the Mason-Dixon line, 
and so on. 
Abstract consequences are distinguished by the fact that they are 
entities of such a sort that they can exist only as the fruits or products 
of corresponding performative acts. They are distinguished further 
by the fact that, like claims, obligations and other legal entities, they 
fall midway between Platonic objects, which lie outside the realm 
of time and change, and real objects of the causal flux. (See Twar-
6. Certainly such abstract consequences may give rise in their tum to concrete 
consequences. The terms 'abstract' and 'concrete' may from this point of view 
be misleading. 
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dowski 1979.) In this respect they are comparable to the natural 
kinds of biology as also to linguistic kinds (such as adverb or 
phoneme) and to the other entities treated of by Husserl ( 1973) under 
the heading 'bound ideality'. 
The feature of dependence upon specific acts of human fiat seems 
to be characteristic of political and administrative spatial objects in 
general, though some manifest this feature to a higher degree than 
others. Thus there are maximally conventional objects of this sort 
whose boundaries are exact geometrical figures, normally straight 
lines (though part of the Delaware-Pennsylvania border is an arc of 
a circle). Straight borders are associated especially with colonial-
ism: they are borders drawn by governments in (Washington, Otta-
wa, London, or Mexico) before they know how things look on the 
ground. Such borders can be quite stable and peaceful (this applies 
also to the colonially drawn borders in the sub-Sahara region), in 
contrast to the carefully drawn boundaries of Europe based on the 
idea of a "self-determination of nations", or to the boundaries 
insisted upon by Irish nationalists, for whom 'Ireland cannot shift 
her frontiers. The Almighty traced them beyond the cunning of man 
to modify.' (Bowman 1982, p. 11) - God made Ireland, we might say, 
but all the rest is the work of man. 
Even those island nations which seem to be blessed with maxi-
mally natural borders are abstract consequences in our sense, how-
ever, which is to say that they are products of human convention or 
fiat. This is because their apparent naturalness disappears when we 
take into account the status of all nations as historical products. 
Certainly any given political or administrative entity may at any 
given time be loosely identified with some given portion of land 
(either a two-dimensional surface or a three-dimensional slab of a 
certain thickness). That this identification is at best loose, however, 
i.e. that we do not have before us here a case of identity, is shown 
by the fact that the surface or slab in question typically existed long 
before the corresponding political or administrative entity came into 
being. The political or administrative entity is marked further by the 
fact that it may change in shape or location, may in other words 
become similarly loosely identified with a different slab or surface 
in the course of time, yet in such a way as to remain itself one and 
identical. 
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At least in many of the cases standardly put forward as natural 
political unities the appearance of naturalness is diminished still 
further in view of the fact that we are dealing not with some one 
single land-mass, but rather with more complex products of human 
demarcation. Ireland, even the unitary Ireland conceived in the 
minds of Irish Republicans, is still in Meinong's terminology an 
'object of higher order': it is a super-unitary entity built up on the 
basis of constituent parts such as Inishkea, Inishmore, Gorumna 
Island, and so on. Other even more conspicuous examples of higher 
order geographical objects are: the Holy Roman Empire, the Euro-
pean Union, the United States of America and so on. Each of the 
latter is a super-unitary spatial whole made up of smaller and 
relatively more unitary parts. On the other side we can distinguish 
sub-unitary spatial objects: spatial parts which can be distinguished 
within larger (and more or less 'natural') unitary wholes: the non-
coastal states and nations of South America and of continental 
Europe are sub-unitary in this sense (and Catalonia and Cornwall 
might be regarded as sub-sub-unitary _spatial objects along the same 
lines).7 Denmark, the Helvetian Confederation, the Commonwealth 
of Independent States are examples of spatial objects which mani-
fest both super- and sub-unitary features, which is to say they are 
at one and the same time the products of unification of scattered 
parts some or all of which are at the same time the products of 
carving out of smaller parts within a larger spatial whole. 
That sub-unitary spatial objects such as Catalonia or the Czech 
Republic are fiat or created objects is shown further by the fact that, 
even where the exterior boundaries of such objects coincide in large 
degree with rivers or other natural topographical features, these 
boundaries are still not identical with the given features; rather, the 
boundaries in question will standardly be identified with some 
non-natural surrogate. The boundary will run, for example, along 
the middle of a river. All legal and political boundaries must, it 
seems, be infinitely thin; they must take up no space, since otherwise 
7. A unitary spatial whole is analogous, if one will, to a single organism; the 
super-unitary whole to a family of organisms; the sub-unitary whole to unde-
tached limbs or organs within a single organism. For more on.these distinctions 
and their applications to geography see Smith 1995. 
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disputes would constantly arise in relation to the no-mans-land 
which the boundaries themselves would then occupy. This 'middle' 
will in the first place be geometrically defined; should the river 
change its course, however, then it may have to be determined by 
negotiation or by some other non-trivial means where its 'middle' 
now lies.8 
A final reason for conceiving political and administrative 
boundaries as created entities (rather then as entities picked out or 
discovered within the pre-existing totality of all relevant geometri-
cally determined possibilities) turns on the fact that there are polit-
ical and administrative boundaries which coincide (occupy an iden-
tical spatial location) throughout their total length. The name 'Vi-
enna' refers on the one hand to a certain Austrian city, on the other 
hand it refers to one of the constituent states (Bundesliinder) of the 
Austrian Republic. As it happens the boundaries of the city and of 
the state of Vienna coincide exactly, and both serve as boundaries 
in the same direction. But they are for all that not identical, as is 
seen in the fact that the two might in principle diverge (as is currently 
true, for example, in relation to the otherwise analogous case of the 
city and state of Salzburg). 
4. Conclusion: Impossible and Incomplete Spatial Objects 
We shall conclude, briefly, with a discussion of a spatial analogue 
of what Meinong referred to as 'impossible' and 'incomplete ob-
jects'. Nothing can be red and green all over. And so, also, we might 
conclude, with our eyes on a map of troop-movements on the 
Indo-Chinese border, nothing can be both Indian and Chinese all 
over. The fundamental principles of international law seem after all 
to dictate, for each given state, exclusive jurisdiction over its nation-
al territory and the permanent population living there together with 
a duty of non-intervention in the area of exclusive jurisdiction of all 
other states. A moment's reflection reveals, however, that parts of 
the earth's surface can indeed be both Indian and Chinese (or British 
and Argentine) all over: something like this applies even under 
8. See Prescott 1978. 
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present political conditions to international waters and to Antarctica, 
and outcomes of this sort were earlier the standard product of one 
favoured method for resolving border-disputes a la Austria-Hunga-
ry, namely through interdynastic marriage and fusion of territories. 
As to incomplete spatial objects, which is to say spatial objects 
lacking crisp exterior boundaries, here a range of examples present 
themselves, beginning with spatial objects depicted on weather 
maps ('an area of high pressure over the Atlantic') and ending with 
territorial regions ('the Khanate of the Golden Horde (circa 1350)', 
'the Seljuk Kingdom of Iconium (circa 1140)') on the fringes of 
areas of settled political power. Objects of these sorts might be said 
to constitute a third category of spatial object, in addition to the fiat 
and bona fide spatial objects distinguished above. They are found 
most conspicuously in the extra-human world (of deserts, clouds, 
gulf-streams, of flocks of birds and shoals of fish), but they are to 
be found depicted also in language- and dialect-atlases, as also in 
maps of religious observance and political behavior. Objects of this 
sort are clearly not the fiat products of some deliberate drawing of 
conventional borders, but nor are they the products of any tracking 
of underlying autonomous contours in nature. As they are depicted 
on maps we might think of them rather as the products of sampling 
(of temperature, air-pressure, rainfall, etc.), to the results of which 
certain standard algorithms are applied to generate bounded regions, 
regions which will however often overlap (and which may be 
represented, pictorially, by means of cross-hatching). Historical 
reflection will tell us, now, that objects of this third sort must inf act 
precede the tidily demarcated fiat spatial objects (nations, states, 
empires) with which we have grown familiar in the course of time. 
As the historian Owen Lattimore expresses it (1962, p. 471 ): 
Frontiers are of social, not geographic origin. Only after the concept 
of a frontier exists can it be attached by the community that has 
conceived it to a geographical configuration. The consciousness of 
belonging to a group, a group that includes certain people and excludes 
others, must precede the conscious claim for that group of the right to 
live or move about within a particular territory. 
The metaphysical treatment of boundaries and frontiers is still, 
unfortunately, in its early stages. One of its tasks will be to do justice 
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to these 'frontiers of social origin' and to the processes by which, 
not singly but in inore or less harmonious consort, they become 
attached to specific regions of space. 
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